We consider a noncooperative N-person discounted Markov game with a metric state space, and define the total expected discounted gain. Under some conditions imposed on the objects in the game system, we prove that our game system has an equilibrium point and each player has his equilibrium strategy. Moreover in the case of a nondiscounted game, the total expected gain up to a finite time can be obtained, and we define the long-run expected average gain. Thus if we impose a further assumption for the objects besides the conditions in the case of the discounted game, then it is proved that the equilibrium point exists in the nondiscounted Markov game. The technique for proving the nondiscounted case is essentially to modify the objects of the game so that they become objects of a modified Markov game with a discounted factor which has an equilibrium point in addition to the equilibrium point of the discounted game.
INTRODUCTION
This paper may be regarded as a continuation of the work of [ 10, 111, where the state space is countable. We now consider the state space as an arbitrary metric space. Our game system is formulated and described in Section 2. We study the optimization problem for the game system with a discount factor so that each player has a maximal total expected discounted gain, and so we prove that there exists an equilibrium point in our game system. To this end, in Section 4 we introduce two linear operators T,(E) and A@) induced from the solution of an integro-differential equation (see Feller [6, p. 4901 ) such that {7',(C)} plays a one-parameter (time parameter) semigroup of (co) contraction operators and A@) is similar to an infinitesimal operator of {T,(C)}. Using A@) as well as the relations with T,(J), we define a new creative operator (not linear) on a Banach space in Section 5. It can be shown that this new operator has a unique fixed point. We then apply Ky Fan's fixed point theorem to prove the existence theorem of an equilibrium point in the discounted Markov game (Theorem 1).
It is interesting that the structure in the proof of the equilibrium point of the game system with a discount factor is applicable to the nondiscounted game. Here we define the long-run expected average gain (see the definition in Section 2), and the optimization problem is also to find an equilibrium point in which every player has a maximal long-run expected average gain in the nondiscounted game. The method used in the study of the nondiscounted game is new. We describe this method in Section 6, and we prove that the nondiscounted Markov game has a constant-gain-valued function in which all players have equilibrium strategies that form an equilibrium point of the game system. All of our game systems are discussed from the viewpoint of functional analysis.
FORMULATION FOR AN N-PERSON GAME WITH A METRIC STATE SPACE
An N-person (noncooperative) Markov game with a discount factor is given by a set of 2N + 4 objects:
(&A', A* ,..., AN, p, q, r', r2 ,..., rN, a).
(
Here, S is a metric space, called the state space of the game; A' is the action space of the ith player, i E N = { 1, 2,..., N], the player set (throughout each, A' is assumed to be a compact metric space); p is a positive function p(s, h) defined on S x A with s E S and d =t (a ', a',..., aN)EA2n~zV=1Ai; q is a probability measure q(. ] s, 6) defined on the Bore1 measurable space (S, 9(S)) for s E S and d E A given, where 9(S) is the Bore1 field of the metric space S; ri is the reward rate function of the ith player, i E N (it is a real-valued function defined on S x A); a is a positive number, namely, the discount factor of the game system. If the discount factor a = 0, the Markov game of (1) is then given by the 2N + 3 objects (S, A '? A ' ,..., AN, P, q, r', r*,..., p) and is called an N-person Markov game without a discount factor. (2) 409/101/1-6
In order to explain our game system, we give some interpretation for a noncooperative N-person Markov game as follows.
For any time t E [0, co), all players observe the variable state of the game system and classify it to one possible state s, E S (which is determined from a stochastic process {X(t)}) at time t. All players then choose their actions tit under some probability &, without any collaboration with the other players. When the multiaction 6, E A is chosen at this state s, E S, each player i E N gains a reward rf(st, a;). In this case the state s, may be preserved by some probability P(s, = st, t < Its,, &) depending on a positive function p(s,, Es,). Such a probability P (sI = s,, t Q IIs,, &) decreases as I increases, and then the process moves to a new state stC at the moment t' > t which is governed by a jump probability q(s,, Is(, 6J associated with a Markov process
Then the entire process of the game system is repeated from the new state s,, (cf. Fig. 1 ). In this type of game system, we will find an existence theorem in which each player has his maximal total expected gain in the game system with a discount factor. If the game system lacks a discount factor, we define a longrun expected average gain for each player and we will find also that each player has his maximal long-run expected average gain so that all players have their optimal strategies.
In a game system, a strategy should, logically, be described as a function which maps information from past history up to the present state of the game process into the action space carried by each player. Precisely, it is a mapping from a state space into a probability measure space. Such a probability measure measures the actions chosen by all the players. Henceforth, a strategy of a player will mean that a mapping maps from the state space S into a probability space P(A) art nr=, P(A '), where P(A i, is the set of all probability measures on the Bore1 measurable space (A i, 9(A i)) for each player i E N.
A strategy ,u' is said to be stationary if it is independent of the past history of the game process and dependent only on the present state, and we denote by xi = [P(A')]' the collection of all stationary strategies for the ith player. For simplicity, we write P(A') instead of [P(A')]' as the stationary strategy space for player i E N. Throughout this paper, we assume that each player uses only the stationary strategy.
We now give elementary definitions in game theory as follows. Suppose that the game process starts from an initial state s E S, and the multistrategy ji =t @ ', p* ,...,,uN) is chosen by the N players. Then, in our game system with a discount factor a, the total expected discounted gain of the ith player is defined by
where E,(+ ]sO = s) denotes the expectation with respect to a transition probability P(t, e Is, ,Li) related to the initial state s and a multistrategy ,U E P(A); that is,
Here s, E S and a; E A are respectively the state and the multiaction of the game process at the time t. In this game process, every player i wishes to choose his strategy p"' E x' such that he can obtain a maximal expected gain &(s,@ for a given initial state s. Thus there exists a multistrategy ,u= @',$,..., jP) satisfying (4) where (u', ui) 2 (,u' ,..., pi-', r$,,~*+',..., cl"), i = 1, 2 ,..., N. This multistrategy F= @W ,..,, ,u") is called an equilibrium point and each strategy ,U~ is called the equilibrium (or optimal) strategy of the ith player (i E N).
For the game with the nondiscounted factor (a = 0), the total expected gain of the ith player up to time T is defined by (5) where the initial state s E S is given and the multistrategy ,U E P(A) is chosen.
The long-run expected average gain of the ith player is defined by c$(s, ,a) = ;", f -qO'(s, 7'3 P).
(6) + An equilibrium point and an equilibrium strategy of each player in the nondiscounted Markov game are defined analogously to the case of a discount factor in which oh(s,,E) is replaced by #(s,,C).
PRELIMINARIES
Additional notation, required for a later context, is given here for the reader's convenience.
The multistrategy, or, equivalently, the probability measure, is denoted by /i = (u1,p2,..., #UN) E fi P(A') s P(A),
i=l which depends on the given state s E S where A = ny=, A'. We use N = { 1, 2,..., NJ as the player set and i= {jEN, j# i}.
For each i E N, the strategy pi E P(A') distinguishes
jti which is employed by all players except the ith player. Thus the multistrategy can be decomposed as follows, ii = tg, g) E rI P(A~) x P(A~), jti (9) and if u" E P(A') then
Since each action space A' is assumed to be compact metrizable, it is separable and then the space C(A') of all real-valued continuous functions on A' is a separable Banach space in the supremum norm topology. We denote the dual space of C(A') by M(A'), which is characterized by a regular bounded measure space on (A', A?@')). The probability space P(A') is a closed unit sphere of M(A') in the weak topology induced from C(A ') topology. It is known that P(A ') is metrized if and only if C(A ') is separable (cf. Dunford and Schwartz [2, V.5.1, Theorem 11). Hence P(A') is a metrizable compact convex subset of M(A'), so is separable. We denote this by M(A)=~;=,M(A').
In order to establish that the game systems (1) and (2) possess respectively the equilibrium points, the following assumptions are cited.
641) ti) P( T 1
s a is a Bore1 measurable function on s E S for a E A, it is continuous on a E A for s E S, and there exists a constant A4 > 0 such that
(ii) q(-(s, 5) is a probability measure on the Bore1 measure space (S, 9(S)) when (s, a) E S x A is given. Further, if d E A and A E .0(S), then q(A ) ., G) is a Bore1 measurable function on S;,if A E 9(S) and s E S, then q(A Is, s) is a continuous function on A. For any A E .59(S), s E S, a E A, the function q satisfies the conditions o<d~ls,q< 1 d{s\ls,q=o q(Sls, a) = 1.
(A2) For each i E N, ri(s, &) is Bore1 measurable on s E S for an ~7 E A, and is continuous on dE A for a s E S. Furthermore, ri is bounded on S x A; that is, there is a K > 0 such that Denote and rys, jq = i, rys, 5) ajqcr).
Note that Q(& s, ,U) and ri(s, ,U) are both multilinear in ,L? = @I,..., pN); that is, for any reals 0, q and any i E N, we have Q(A, s, tj& fi' + vu')) = OQ(A, s, C,u', v')) + tlQ(A s, tj& 0')) for all s E S and t E [0, co). In general, (16) has a unique solution P(t, A 1 s, p) such that for some measurable set A c S, and it possesses the following properties: for any is E fV),
(1) mAls,fi)
is absolutely continuous on t when s E S and A E qs), (2) W,~ls,$ is Bore1 measurable in s E S when t E (0, co) and A E qn and s E S.
Furthermore, it can be shown that there exists (cf. [ 161) a Markov process {X(t,,Z); t E [0, co)} in the state space S corresponding to the solution P(t, A Is, p), a probability distribution, for which X(t + t,, ,G) = x belongs to a subset A c S at time t + t, where X(t,,,Z) = s, t, E [0, co). From this viewpoint, the solution P(t, A Is, ,U) is also called the transition probability from s into A with respect to the Markov process {X(t,p): t E [0, co)}.
Let B(S) be the set of all bounded, Bore1 measurable, real-valued functions on S. Now for a multistrategy p E P(A) at the moment t E [0, co), we introduce two bounded linear operators 7',(E) and A@) of B(S) -+ B(S) which are defined respectively by Tt@) 4s) = I, u(x) WY dxIw4 (18) and (19) By using the properties of the transition probability P(t, A ) s, ,0), one sees easily that T,(J) satisfies the conditions
(T2) Tt,@) Tt2@) 4s) = Tt,+JA u(s); (21) that is, {T,(Q)); t E [0, co)} is a one-parameter ((C,) contraction) semigroup of bounded linear operators on B(S) associated with the transition probability P(t, A Is, /7) or, equivalently, with the Markov process {X(t, ,0)}. The relations between 7',(E) and A@) are given by the following lemmas, which are immediate by the general theory on semigroup operators. 
LEMMA 1. For any multistrategy p = (,ul,..., p") E P(A) and u E B(S), the operators T,(U) and A@) satisfy the equation
where a is the discount factor in the game system (1) and I is the identity operator on B(S).
Proof: Formula (24) follows directly from the elementary calculation 
where a is the discount factor, M is the constant of (10) in (Al), and I is the identity operator. Then from (Al), (13), and (19), for any U, v E B(S) we get I( Tyii)u -T'(E))u 11 Q g-pll.
Hence T'(U) is a contraction mapping on B(S), a Banach space with norm IIuJl= supsss lu(s)l. By the Banach fixed point theorem, there exists a unique fixed point, namely, ai@)), satisfying the identity (27) where u'@)(s) is the function value of u'(U) at s E S. Let M + a multiply (27). We then obtain au'@)(s) = ri(s, /7) + A (ii) u'@)(s) (28) or (a1 -A (ii)) u'@)(s) = ri(s, fl). where #(s,p) E B(S) for any p E P(A). By (A2) and (14), we see that #(s,,U) is bounded on S x P(A), and it follows directly from (29) and (18) that II e@l < K/a for all p E P(A). By (29), the following lemma is immediate.
(30)
LEMMA 3. For any s E S and i E N, u'@)(s) is continuous on p E P(A).
Proof. By (A2) and (14), #(s,,U) is bounded on S X P(A) and is continuous on P(A) for each s E S. From (13), Q(A, s, ji) is continuous on P(A) and so Av) is continuous on P(A) by its definition (19). for u E B(S), where fi E P(A) is given, a is the discount factor, and M is the constant in (A 1). As the definition of (26), the {. } on the right-hand side of (31) is written by T'(,u', 0') U(S), and so @') can be written as 27$j u(s) = rnOy I+(#, ~7') U(S).
Mutatis mutandis, it is shown, as for T'(E), that P(,u') is a contraction; that is, for any U, v E B(S), and hence ?(,u') has a unique fixed point u(u') in B(S). Thus zd#)(s) = m:x Ti(.ui, I+) u@')(s) = Qlij u(pi)(s).
Analogous to (28), the expression (33) is reduced to au(ui)(s) = my{r'(s, (u', a')) + A(#, ~7') u(u')(s)}.
(33)
To simplify for any u E B(S), we let
Since T'(u', a') is continuous on P(A), so is L'(ui, ui). The following lemma is essential for the existence of an equilibrium point. 
Proof. Since every action space A i is a compact metric space, the probability measure space P(A ') is metrized as a compact convex subset of M(A '). Thus P(A) = I-I;= 1 P(A ') is a compacet convex metrizable space and thus is separable. Now for each i E N, and any s E S, we define a point-to-set mapping
Evidently G&i) is nonempty closed since L'(,u', oi) U(S) is continuous on the compact space P(A), and so such a maximum is attained. Further, Gf(,ii) is convex for ,U E P(A) since L'(,u', a') u(s) is concave (linear) with respect to ci. We write (2) is a convex closed nonempty subset of P(A). Here if we can prove that G, is upper semicontinuous then by Ky Fan's fixed point theorem [3] , there exists &, E G,&). Further we must show that this ,u,, is in P(A), that is, show that cl0 is a Bore1 measurable mapping from S into P(A) defining a multistrategy, so that the proof will be complete.
We proceed with these proofs as follows. First, we show that G, is upper semicontinuous. To this end, let {&} be a sequence in P(A) such that ,iik +,&, as k-+ co and choose 1, E G@,J such that 1, + 1,. Then (37) Let 6= (u',..., a") be an arbitrary element of G,&,). By the continuity of L'@'", oi) U(S) on P(A), for the sequence {&} in P(A), we get
Letting k-, co, we obtain Lvp;;, a') u(s) < L'c& n;> u(s).
Since dE G,(&), the inequality (38) must be an equality. Hence (37) holds.
From this fact (the upper semicontinuity of G,), there exists a fixed point &, E G,&) (cf. Fan [3] ). This means that for any s E S, and each i E N, Next we show that this ,& is 9(S) measurable. Since L '(~6, a') u(s) is continuous in ui E P(A') and P(A' is separable, it follows that for any real c, {s]m:x L'(ai, a') u(s) < c} = ,?,, (slL'@~, ~7') u(s) < c} t is a measurable set where Ti is a countable dense subset of &I'). Hence Lib;, a') U(S) is measurable with respect to the Bore1 field 9(S). Consequently, from Lemma 1 of Benei [ 11, we see that there exists a Bore1 measurable map ,u!+ from S into P(A') such that
Since L'(ub, a') U(S) is concave (linear) in ui E P(A') and its maximum is attained by ,u; for each i E N, thus if we replace ~16 by ,u;, we get
for any s E S.
Therefore the proof is complete. I
By the above preparations, we come to one of our main theorems, 
We have shown the continuity of u'@) on P(A) in Lemma 3 or equivalently (29), and it follows that &(s, 015, ui)) is also continuous on P(A). Since P(A) is compact with respect to the induced topology, the supremum supDi oL(s, (,&, ui) ) is attained such that 4/&>(s) = sup &(s, (S 9 a')) 0i
for each i E N and any given initial state s E S. Hence the proof is complete. I
THE EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM POINT IN A NONDISCOUNTED MARKOV GAME
Throughout this section, we further conditions in addition to the assumptions (Al), (i) and (ii), for the function p(s, 6) and the probability measure q(. 1 s, G); that is, (Al ') Besides (Al) we assume that (i') there exists a number /I > 0 such that 0 <P<P(S,@<M for all (s, 6) E S X A ;
(ii') there exist some state s,, E S and a number 0 < y < 1 such that q(ls,J Is, a) > Y > 0 for s#sO, for all 6EA.
It should be noted that from (A 1 '), the unique solution P(t, /i 1 s, ji) of (16) for any fl E P(A) is honest; that is, for each s E S and t E [0, co), P@, Sls,jq = 1.
Under these conditions, we define a new function j(s, a) and a new probability measure Q (. 1 s, a) Therefore in either case, 0 < i(A (s, E) < 1, which is a probability measure on (S, 9(S)) and satisfies (Al), (ii).
Next, let us consider the modr@ed Murkou game as follows, (&A' ,... , AN, fi, G, r',..., p, PY), (2') with a discount factor /?r instead of a in ( 
Here the second equality of (48) is expressed as so it becomes the last equality of (48). Therefore by adding PYa&(so) -PruOlS)(s)
to both sides of (48) and by using the notation (19), we get If s = sO, it is obvious that Pv4pS)(so) = m~~x{r'(so, Cui, 4) + AolS, 0') 4&)(so)l.
With the above preparations, we can prove our second main theorem as follows. THEOREM 2. Under (Al ') and (A2), the noncooperative N-person nondiscounted Markov game (2) has an equilibrium point and each player has his optimal (equilibrium) strategy.
Proof. Let g(j&) = /Iy~@~)(s,,). By (49) and (50), it follows that gc4) z L'olS 3 ui) d&)(s) for all s E S and any oi E P(A'); that is, g@i) > ri(s, (4, d)) + Al&, a') z&J(s).
By the positivity of Tt defined in (18), we can use a linear operator T,@$ , a') of a one-parameter semigroup acting on both sides of (5 1) which possesses the same inequality sign. Furthermore, by using the honest property induced from (Al '), (i'), we arrive at the inequality d&J Z T,@i, a') ri(s, (us, 0')) + T,l,&, u') A&, ui) u(d+J(s).
Then, using (22) for T&i, a') A@$, ui) in (52) and integrating both sides of (52) with respect to time t from 0 to T < 00, we have Md-) >I T,oli, ui) ri(s, f,ui, ui)) dt + TT@i 3 U') UC&$)(S) -U@~)(S).
Dividing by T and then letting T-r CO, we obtain the superior limit as follows:
=iGi rp'(s, T, t&t, ui))
T-tCO T = ds, tj& ) a')).
Similarly, at the point ,&, it follows from (49) and (50) that we arrive at a limit g(&) = lim As, T, iJ*> T-toO T = CPTS, L-i*) for any s E S.
By (53) and (54), for any initial state s E S and each player i E IV, we obtain the optimal value function q+(s, &) = m:x f&s, (~5, ~7~)).
The point ,& is then an equilibrium point. Hence the proof of this theorem is complete. I
Remark. Note that the equilibrium point ,ii* in the modified discounted Markov game (2') is the same as the equilibrium point in the original game (2) without the discount factor.
